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Robert Gay*

Introduction
It has now been more than a decade since theBrazilian military relinquished its
hold on the electoral process. Effective democratic governance has yet to be
established, however. Traditional elites still dominate the scene, political par
ties remain weak, fragmented and unstable, and public administrations contin
ue to pay lip-service to demands for citizens' rights.The source of these various
problems of democratic governance is,by all accounts, thewidespread practice
of exchanging votes for favors, otherwise known as clientelism. It is clientelism
that forges relations of dependency between masses and elites. It is clientelism
that stifles popular organization and protest. And, it is clientelism that reduces
elections to localized disputes over the distribution of spoils.1
In this essay, Iwill argue that clientelism is indeed an essential and enduring
feature of theBrazilian political landscape. Iwill also argue, however, that both
the form and the function of contemporary clientelism remain unexamined
and that, as a consequence,
its role in the political process has been misunder
stood or, worse still, ignored.With few exceptions, clientelism is condemned as
an instrument of elite control and called upon to explain all that iswrong with
Brazilian democracy. I will argue that clientelism should not be seen as some
immutable force or fixed thing, but as a relationship that is subject to constant
challenge, renegotiation and change. I will also argue that, under certain cir
cumstances, clientelism plays a positive and largely unheralded role in the
process of democratic consolidation.
My comments in the first part of this essay shall be confined, for the most
inBrazil. Towards the end, however,
part, to the literature on democratization
Iwill be drawing on recent research on clientelism from other contexts inLatin
America. There are two reasons for this. First, there is precious little research
on theway that clientelism works inBrazil. And, second, ithas become accept
ed practice to blame clientelism for the slow and halting pace of democratic
consolidation not only inBrazil, but in almost every other country in the re
gion.2
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Clientelism

isDead...

Between 1964 and 1985, dates that roughly correspond to themost recent peri
od of authoritarian rule, Brazil underwent a dramatic transformation from an
agrarian, primary product producer to one of the world's largest industrial
economies.
Industrialization was accompanied
of
by the proletarianization
much of the labor force, the emergence of a complex social class structure and
rapid rates of urbanization thatwere fueled, in part, by a massive population
shift from the now peripheral Northeast to the dynamic and overburdened

cities of the South.
Observers of Brazilian politics predicted that, together, these processes of
'massification' would weaken the power of traditional landed elites and liber
ate an increasingly mobile population from the tyranny of small town and rural
life.Others pointed to the expansion, throughout the authoritarian era, of an
to Paul Cammack,
increasingly powerful and interventionist state. According
this state was created, inpart, to introduce rational policy making and planning
procedures to an administration that, to this point, had been dominated by
corrupt, so-called traditional politicians who distributed public goods and ser
vices as patronage. This state also provided a significant source of new employ
ment opportunities that were allocated according to merit and promoted at
least the idea that government intervention was based not on the principle of
political favoritism but of social need.3
that the elim
More recently, scholars of Brazilian politics have maintained
ination of clientelism has also been facilitated by the rapid development of
print and, more significantly, television media as the principal means of mass

to Venicio de Lima,
communication and political socialization. According
mass media, as opposed to local party structures, has been the deciding factor
in a number of what, in recent years, can be characterized as regularly held and
relatively free elections.4 Regularly held and relatively free elections, in turn,
have meant increased competition among elites and an electorate that is both
more familiar and comfortable with its recently acquired democratic respon
sibilities.5
Finally, many scholars attribute the transformation of Brazilian politics in
recent years to the emergence, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, of so-called
new social movements. Inspired by what was often described as the resurrec
tion of civil society, early observers of the new social movement phenomenon
predicted that the popular sector would wage a 'war of position' that would

destroy the legitimacy of the authoritarian state, undermine support for clien
telist political parties, and sweep the radical, democratic Left to power.6 Sub
(PT)
sequent disappointments, the near election of Partido dos Trabalhadores'
Luis Ignacio da Silva notwithstanding, have given rise tomore cautious per
on post authoritarian politics.
spectives on the impact of social movements
formal
Instead of predicting the strategic gains to be made by popular-based
on
now
the
focus
their
attention
and
scholars
political parties,
organizations
democratization of political culture and social relations as a whole.7 What this
means is that while few would claim that new social movements have revolu
tionized Brazilian politics, there is a consensus that they have articulated new
demands, established alternative discursive arenas, challenged dominant prac
tices and achieved, at the very least, a measure of symbolic power.8

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Revista Europea

de Estudios

Latinoamericanos

y del Caribe

65, diciembre

de

1998

| 9

More specifically, there are those who argue that the emergence of an auton
omous and vital popular sector has meant that political actors are forced to
work much harder as they are confronted by an ever increasing number of
popular organizations, NGOs and representative bodies.9 They also argue that
politicians, political parties and public administrations can no longer rely on
the distribution of patronage, in the form of public works and political appoint
ments, as ameans to generate or secure votes.10 In other words, the foundations
of clientelism are gradually being undermined.
Sonia Alvarez and Evelina Dagnino, for example, claim thatwhat they refer
to as social movement webs have 'rewo ven or reconfigured.. .the fabric of col
lective action inBrazil'.11 They also maintain that social movement webs have
fashioned new constituencies based on 'communities of equals' that are con
frontational, oftentimes disloyal, and committed to the ideal of rights. These
new popular movements, argue Alvarez and Dagnino, are to be distinguished
from those that endured traditional clientelist ties with the 'populist-corpora
tist and authoritarian political establishments' of the recent and not so recent
past.12

Long

Live Clientelism...

claim that clientelism is of declining significance in Brazil has not gone
unchallenged. Many scholars dispute the widely-held assumption that clien
and point out that,while per
telism is the inevitable victim of modernization
sonalism and dependency have characterized elite-mass relations since the
time of the conquest, the exchange of votes for favors is, in fact, a relatively
recent phenomenon.13 Itwas only in the post World War II era that themore
traditional elements of the landed elite confronted the fact that they needed
new, more sophisticated strategies to protect their interests in the face of the
rapid expansion of the state. Itwas also in the post World War II era thatBrazil
entered the age ofmass politics, meaning that, for the first time since the end of
the nineteenth century, a significant element of the population was granted the
right to vote.14
Others argue that the process of bureaucratization, far from eliminating cli
entelism, has, in fact, greatly increased the opportunities that exist for buying
votes. Maria Castro and Vilmar Faria insist that government emergency and
assistance programs continue to be made available on a selective and piece
meal basis and that administrative posts, while short-term and inherently un
stable, provide access to considerable public resources.15 Barry Ames has also
argued that despite recent attempts to 'modernize' the civil service, it is still the
case that the fate of perhaps themajority of public sector employees, and a
significant proportion of the population as a whole, depends on the presence
and goodwill of a patron, or what is popularly referred to as a quern indica or
The

pistoldo.16

There are also those who claim that toomuch has been made of the impact of
mass media and that the outcome of both local and national elections is still
largely determined by carefully constructed political networks and the rela
tionships that are brokered between them.17Many scholars argue that 'mod
ern' political parties developed exceptionally late in Brazil and that the mil
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itary inherited a clientelist system that itmaintained
through restricted, but
nonetheless continuous, electoral competition, low levels of repression, and
substantial government spending. As a consequence, the transition to democ
racy, when it came, was dominated by so-called traditional political actors
whose power was based on archaic patterns of mobilization
and who subse
quently engaged in a spree of 'wild clientelism' in the late 1980s and early
1990s.18
Frances Hagopian
argues that the spending spree of the immediate post
authoritarian era was made possible by an increase in government payroll
spending, the decentralization of power to state and municipal governments
and massive local government borrowing from state controlled banks.19 Others
maintain that the post authoritarian spending spree was a product of the in
stitutional context within which elections were now held. The combination,
peculiar to only a few countries, of proportional representation, open party
lists and large multimember districts resulted in extreme party instability and
inter and intra-party competition.20 Furthermore, according to
considerable
Scott Mainwaring,
theBrazilian military had, by then, stripped Congress of any
real legislative function. This meant, in effect, that politicians had little alterna
tive but to rely on the distribution of patronage as a means to secure election or
reelection. Thus, formany, democratization
resulted not in the elimination of
clientelism but in the proliferation of clientelist-based
'deals'.21
Scholars have also disputed the assumption that so-called new social move

ments have transformed authoritarian structures and democratized political
and social relations. They have argued that popular organizations tend to be
extremely unstable and short-lived and that they bring together an insignif
icant element of the population.22 They have also argued that the vast majority
of popular sector demands are for limited, primarily economic resources that
are easily absorbed or diverted by the state.23Finally, scholars have also argued
that the obsession with radical, if somewhat marginal aspects of Brazilian cul
ture has led social scientists to underestimate support for themilitary and to
ignore the fact thatmany organizations serve traditional functions and repro
duce relations of hierarchy upon which clientelism ultimately depends.24
Perhaps the most common explanation for the persistence of clientelism,
however, iswidespread poverty and increasingly savage inequality. Literally
millions have failed to benefit or have benefitted only marginally from the
in Brazil.25 Indeed, widespread poverty and
fruits of capitalist development
inequality have ledmany scholars to suggest that it is difficult, ifnot impossible,
forBrazil's poor to participate effectively in the political process and that they
have become, to quote Marx, the 'bribed tool of reactionary intrigue'.26
The assumption that the least privileged elements of Brazilian society are

effectively in the political process needs to be examined
I say this because it informs not only the largely
however.
extremely carefully,
academic debate about democratization, but also attempts at institutional re
form such as the elimination of the compulsory vote.27 The problem with this
assumption is that it is based on extremely thin evidence and that itmisrepre
sents what is, arguably, the vast majority of the Brazilian population's most

unable

to participate

effective political weapon.
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Clientelism as Tradition
in Latin
Scholarly images of clientelism, from both Brazil and elsewhere
America, are overwhelmingly negative. As a system of what is often consid
ered pre-modern politics it is blamed for everything from cycles of ruinous
inflation to the breakdown of democratic regimes. More importantly, at least
for the purposes of this essay, clientelism is also blamed for the disorganization
of Brazil's poor. Most scholars agree that the extreme
and marginalization
vulnerability of perhaps themajority of the Brazilian population compels it to
literally 'sell' itsvotes to candidates for public office in exchange for the deliv
ery or simply the promise of patronage. The consequences of this exchange are
thought to be as follows.
First of all, most scholars argue that clientelism is responsible for the estab
lishment and consolidation of networks of solidarity, trust and, more signif
icantly, subordination between political elites and masses that interferewith, if
not preclude, the collective organization of the popular sector on the basis of
social class.28 Collective organization is inhibited because political returns are
offered along vertical lines and because ofwhat are perceived as asymmetrical,
patron-client relations between leaders and followers of client organizations
themselves. Indeed, Guillermo O'Donnell
insists that clientelism is not only
for
the
of
the
but that it generates 'fierce re
poor,
fragmentation
responsible
sistance on behalf of subalterns to organize as collective subjects and to be
represented

as

such'.29

there are many who believe that clientelism discourages what is
alternatively referred to as 'real' or 'meaningful' political participation and
that the relationship between politician and voter is so unequal that the ex
change of votes for favors is almost wholly dependent on the goodwill and
generosity of those in positions of power. Indeed, Fabio Wanderly Reis argues
that the uncertainty and asymmetry of this relationship encourages would-be
clients to become passive, uninformed and essentially disinterested participa
nts in the political process and to shy away from alternative, more confronta
tional means of interest representation.30
Third, most scholars claim that the rewards that are sometimes obtained
through clientelism are inconsequential and unworthy of the vote and that the
role played by patronage in elections is evidence of the backwardness, defi
ciency and low level of sophistication of the average Brazilian voter. One of the
problems associated with clientelist exchange, therefore, is that it focuses the
popular sector's attention on the immediate acquisition of localized and small
scale goods and services as opposed to a series ofmore significant, generalized
and long term demands. Thus, formany, clientelism makes it extremely diffi
cult for voters to organize their thoughts in terms of a left-rightor any other
continuum and places tremendous strain on what is often referred to as ide
ological or programmatic politics.31
Second,

Finally, most scholars agree that clientelism, when looked at from a systemic
level, constrains universalism, devitalizes civil society and prevents the popular
sector from mounting sustained pressure on the state.32Clientelism also,
by
implication, allows politicians to ignore what are perceived to be weak and
disorganized actors and to by-pass and, as a consequence, undermine so-called
normal democratic procedures by essentially buying votes.33
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My objective in this essay is not to deny that any, or even all, of these obser
vations about the relationship between Brazilian elites and masses are true.
Rather, the point is to suggest the possibility that clientelism performs other
functions and to caution against its use as a largely unexamined and residual
category that accounts for all that iswrong with contemporary Brazilian de
mocracy. Unfortunately, as Jose Murilo de Carvalho observed almost three
decades ago, 'the relationship between leaders and followers is not clarified.
This relationship is often characterized as 'paternalistic' or 'clientelistic' but
these terms are not clearly defined and no systematic procedure is adopted to
clarify how this relationship works'.34
The most recent and, inmany ways, most systematic research on clientelism
claims that the Brazilian
has been conducted by Frances Hagopian. Hagopian
was
to
enlist
the
support of so-called traditional
military
ultimately compelled
'the
underside'
of
the state, which conducts 'low
who
controlled
elites
political
sub
consent'.35
These
and
elites, argues Hagopian,
organizes
political
politics'
to
access
to
of
the
state-led
used
their
development
capitalist
spoils
sequently
lock up an expanding and increasingly urban electorate that had, nonetheless,
'conditioned by years of patronage-based
appeals'.36
can best be described as
Contemporary clientelism, according toHagopian,
a distinctive and resilient system of top-down mobilization
that is based not so
on
or
on
but
the selective and
of
forms
coercion
traditional
much
authority,
services
and
of
employment opportuni
goods,
highly personalized exchange
ties for the vote. This system, she argues, discourages political participation
in character, and interfereswith, ifnot
beyond the ballot box, is nonideological
been

precludes, the extension of democracy.37
work is interesting in that she recognizes that certain aspects of
Hagopian's
the clientelist relationship have changed. Unfortunately, her research focuses
almost exclusively on institutional representations of the clientelist system in
terms of the career trajectories of so-called traditional political elites, with
is left no choice,
particular emphasis on the state ofMinas Gerais. Hagopian
therefore, but to assume that the persistence of traditional elites can be ex
means clientelist, poli
plained by the persistence of traditional, by which she
no
or
to
themeaning or form of
little
tics.Hagopian
attention, however,
pays
clientelism at the popular level or, in her words, the specific ways inwhich the
state and the popular sectors in contemporary Brazil are 'attached'.38
Similar conclusions as to the significance of clientelism inBrazil were reac

Brasileiro
hed by Eli Diniz in her classic study of theMovimento Democratico
inRio
the
MDB
of
that
the
Diniz
claimed
Janeiro.39
in
Rio
de
image
(MDB)
was very much at odds with that of the national party in that the electoral
prowess of its dominant faction, otherwise known as Chaguistas, depended
almost exclusively on the selective exchange of votes for favors.
Diniz argued that the city of Rio de Janeiro in the early 1980s could be
divided up into distinct, mutually exclusive zones thatwere dominated by indi
vidual Chaguista politicians. These politicians disposed of a certain number of
low level government jobs, facilitated access to state and municipal adminis
trations, and controlled both the activities and outlook of local popular sector
organizations. This was particularly true, according toDiniz, of the relation
and favela neighborhood
ship between traditional elements within theMDB
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associations that adopted passive, nonconfrontational strategies for the pursuit
of a series of local, relatively inconsequential demands.40
The Chaguistas' stranglehold on the local population was only challenged in
the late 1970s and early 1980s when elements of the favela movement pushed
for the organization of more autonomous, combative and ideologically-ori
ented neighborhood associations. This led, according to Diniz, to the emer
gence of competing federations of favelas inRio which represented, what were
fast becoming,

distinct and diametrically

opposed

bases of popular

political

support.

Diniz's study is interesting in that it represents at least an attempt to come to
grips with the phenomenon of clientelism at the local as opposed to regional or
national level of politics. Like Hagopian, however, Diniz relies too heavily on
aggregate-level election data and largely untested assumptions about the polit
ical behavior upon which such data are based; save for a small selection of

interviews with politicians and leaders of favela neighborhood associations.
Furthermore, Diniz is guilty of insisting on a stark and extremely rigid dis
tinction between traditional, or clientelist, politics and modern, or radical, poli
tics at both the legislative and popular levels.41
The notion that clientelism and radicalism represent different styles and
patterns of collective action, or inaction, has been developed most fully by
Susan Stokes in her study of a low-income neighborhood
in Lima, Peru.42
Stokes argues that formuch of this century the urban poor existed as the pas
sive, fatalistic, loyal and, most significantly,misinformed clients of an oligarchic
state. Then, in the late 1960s, the Velasco military regime unleashed hitherto
dormant counterhegemonic forces that itwas subsequently unable to control.
This led, according to Stokes, to the emergence of a bifurcated popular politi
cal culture that expressed the very different world views of what she character
izes as hierarchical clientelists and class-solidary radicals who 'promulgated an
ethic of rights, protest, participation, and egalitarianism'.43
Stokes' work is interesting in that it is based on extensive field research
among the urban poor. Unlike others, therefore, she gives us a sense of the
ways in which the various relationships between elites and masses are both
perceived and played out. Her research is problematic, however, in that in her
haste to convince us of the rising tide of popular radicalism and protest, she
reduces clientelism to a timeless and unchanging mode of participation, or
non-participation, that is the product, not even of strategic or symbolic resist
In other words, Stokes wishes us to believe
ance, but of 'false consciousness'.
that the subordination of the least privileged elements of Peruvian society has
been so successful and complete that is has been unaffected by massive social
change, labor union organization, land invasion, peasant-led rebellion and the
dissemination of radical or even liberal democratic discourse.44

Clientelism as (Post) Modernity
In his study of union politics in the industrial suburbs of Sao Paulo, John
French argues that it has become accepted dogma that, until fairly recently,
Brazilian
labor unions have been subordinated to the state. This dogma, he
is
based not on careful empirical investigation but on theoretically
suggests,
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charged speculation. More to the point, French suggests that this has enabled
scholars of 'new' unionism, particularly in Sao Paulo, tomake largely unsub
stantiated claims about the greater class-consciousness of contemporary Brazi
lian workers.45

the same could be said about recent research on popular political
participation outside of the context of organized labor. Scholars of contempo
in the post au
rary Brazilian politics have argued that new social movements
thoritarian era have been organized on the basis of new ideas about collective
identity and citizens' rights that distinguish them from the fragmented and
hierarchical 'action sets' that tied the popular sector to elites in the past.46 This
comparison, I would argue, is no longer valid, if indeed it ever was, in that
changes in the relationship between elites and masses in Brazil have had an
impact on all political relationships, including those based on clientelism.
Much

There is considerable evidence to suggest that clientelism, both inBrazil and
is increasingly a means to pursue the delivery of
elsewhere inLatin America,
collective as opposed to individual goods.47 This means that political clienteles
are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated
dyads than organizations, communities or even whole regions that fashion re
lationships or reach understandings with politicians, public officials and admin
istrations. In other words, contemporary clientelism exhibits both hierarchical
and relational elements and elements of collective organization and identity.48
There is also evidence that clientelism is an increasingly voluntary, trans
actional and, as a result, unstable relationship between both political elites and
masses and the representatives and rank-and-file members of clientelist-based
organizations themselves. Clientelist politicians and community leaders who
fail to deliver on a consistent basis soon lose support and are replaced by oth
ers. Indeed, there are those who argue that the relationship between clientelist
politician and voter ismore sporadic, instrumental and diffuse in nature than
the dense, stable and all-embracing networks of informal reciprocity and mu
tual solidarity that characterize the relationships between and among elites
and themiddle class.49
Finally, it is also important to note that the relationship between clientelist
politician and voter in Brazil is by no means as unequal as it once was. The
recent transition to democracy has witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of
both inter and intra-party competition for votes.50 Furthermore, changes in
election procedure, such as the introduction of official ballots and, more re
cently, automated voting machines, have significantly reduced both the oppor
tunities that are available for fraud and the degree of control that politicians
enjoy over the vote. It is not uncommon, for example, for voters to demand
someone
compensation prior to an election and to throw their support behind
else. The consequences of such a deception are, arguably, much greater for a
candidate forpublic office than for those who chose to dishonor such an 'agree

ment'.51

This is not to say that patronage is no longer rewarded at the ballot box. On
the contrary, this is still the essence of clientelism. The problem is thatwe have
become so accustomed to thinking of clientelism as a mechanism of institution
- or the
- often referred to as
al control
product of 'false con
corporatism
- thatwe have failed to consider the
- often referred to as
sciousness'
populism
as a popular political strategy.52
possibility that clientelism might be embraced
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Even Jonathan Fox, in his brilliant and ground-breaking essay on elite-mass
relations inMexico, claims that the distinction between what he refers to as
'semiclientelism' and pluralism is the ability of the popular sector - in the latter
case - to gain access tomaterial resources without giving up its right to express

its interests autonomously.53 Fox also argues that 'if the state's mechanisms for
enforcing voter compliance continue toweaken, thenmore and more citizens
may well accept pork-barrel funding but also still vote their conscience, as civic
activism broadens and deepens'.54
What I am suggesting is that there is no necessary contradiction between
rewarding patronage at the ballot box and 'voting one's conscience'. I am also
suggesting that rewarding patronage at the ballot box is increasingly a means
by which a seasoned and increasingly disillusioned electorate expresses its col
lective approval, or disapproval, of a candidate for public office or adminis
tration's performance.55 And, finally, I am also suggesting that, under such cir
cumstances, clientelism has less to do with the exchange of votes for favors,
than with the exchange of votes forwhat political actors would like to present
as favors but the least privileged elements of the population demand or claim
as rights. In other words, not only is itbecoming increasingly difficult for politi
cal actors to create a sense of loyalty or obligation on the part of the electorate,

it is also becoming increasingly necessary for politicians, public officials and
administrations to disguise the fact that they are, ultimately, in the business of
buying votes.56
Of course, as I have already mentioned, there are those who would insist that
rights have little to do with the selective and occasional distribution of milk
tokens, the paving of roads, the building of schools or the installation of neigh
borhood sewage systems. And, furthermore, that clientelism, as a strategy that
is based on the delivery of such goods and services, undermines any attempt to
propagate coherent ideologies or establish programs based on principles of
universalism and entitlement. This perspective, I believe, isboth simplistic and,
more to the point, elitist.57
First of all, it is a mistake to assume that the exchange of votes for goods and
services is necessarily devoid of ideological content. Since the early 1980s ev
eryone, including the Right, has been talking about popular participation in
government. Popular participation, in and of itself, is no guarantee, however,
that issues of popular concern will be resolved. Indeed, there are those who
claim that popular participation in government is a cheap and effective way of
demobilizing and exhausting the opposition.58 In this context, it is important to
appreciate that the role played by patronage in elections is evidence, inmany
instances, of the emergence of a new breed of voter who demands respect,
efficiency and, most important of all, accountability from public officials and
administrations of all political persuasions. All too often, the 'politically in
correct' electoral choices of the popular sector are dismissed, out of hand,
without considering the possibility that they are based on criteria that cut
across traditional political boundaries.59
Second, the assumption that the popular sector is somehow the captive do
main of clientelist-oriented politicians is clearly unfounded. Many scholars
have found evidence to suggest that different elections mean different things
and are approached as such. In other words, while individuals, or groups of
individuals, may vote on the basis of the promise or delivery of fairly specific
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and localized goods at one level, they are just as likely to 'vote their conscience'
at other levels.60This appreciation of the different functions of various levels of
municipal, state and federal government suggests that clientelism is not an
all-embracing, imposed-from-above world view but a strategy that is both se
lectively employed and the product of a sophisticated and reasoned grasp of
the political process as a whole.61

Finally, it should also be kept inmind thatwhile universalism and citizenship
are attractive concepts in the abstract, they take on very different meanings in
the course of everyday life.A decade or so of regularly held and relatively free
elections has done nothing to convince people that politicians are any less
corrupt or insincere and has leftmore people without access to decent paying
jobs, education, health care and housing than ever before. It should come as no

surprise, therefore, that the least privileged elements of Brazilian
society
should be suspicious of what are essentially foreign ideologies, distrust formal
institutions, and embrace clientelism as a hedge against what is often perceived
not as democratization but as bureaucratic indifference and exclusion.62
Unfortunately, there is very little empirical research that focuses specifically
on the way that clientelism works in contemporary Brazil. Some of the best
research has been done by Geert Banck who warned, a long time ago, that
clientelism was becoming a largely untested and static image and that it 'nei
ther slips away nor is it immutable until some insurmountable contradictions
destroy it'.63Banck's work is interesting because he recognizes that political
actors in contemporary Brazil have to work much harder to cash in on favor
itism, nepotism and corruption. The problem, he points out, is that politicians
are under increasing pressure from above and below to be both more transpar
ent and accountable and to deliver the goods. Banck is also one of few to

that politicians employ in their
attempt to examine the specific mechanisms
to
unreliable
bases of support, such as the
maintain
their
attempts
increasingly
notorious tremde alegria.64
Outside of Brazil, some of the best research has been done by Gerrit Burg
wal.65 Burgwal found that clientelism and radicalism were competing yet com
plimentary strategies that were alternatively employed by the urban poor in
their attempts to extract, primarily collective, resources from the state. His
research in a low-income settlement in Quito, Ecuador, demonstrates quite
clearly that the distinctions that are made between different political strategies
are much less clear than we are led too believe. More specifically, Burgwal's
nuanced and extremely thorough ethnography suggests that not only are col
lective organization and protest fundamental aspects of contemporary clien
telism but that nepotism, favoritism and exclusion are, themselves, no strang
ers to so-called radical approaches to community development.66
in her research on
Similar conclusions were reached by Cristina Escobar
in the region she
that
found
Escobar
movements
Colombia.67
in
Sucre,
peasant
was studying a strong peasant movement emerged to contest the future of the
agrarian sector in the face of the processes ofmodernization and capitalization.
What she discovered was that thismovement succeeded in breaking the power
of traditional landed elites, reconfiguring certain aspects of its relationship
with a new breed of political brokers, and achieving greater returns for the
vote. Furthermore, while Escobar recognizes that the success of the peasant
movement was greatly constrained by the relatively authoritarian nature of the
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Colombian
state, clientelist relations were entered into 'not in the absence of
'class consciousness' but in spite of it'.68
Finally, some of themost innovative research is being conducted by Javier
aspects of Peronism inArgentina. Auyero
Auyero on the micro-sociological
that
the
of
argues
patronage is a necessary but insufficient condition
delivery

for the operation of contemporary clientelism and that the 'cluster of beliefs,
assumptions, styles, skills, and habits encompassing the exchanges
explaining
and clarifying them, justifying and legitimizing them
is as important as the
actual exchanges themselves'.69 Auyero's work is important in that it suggests
that clientelism is as much a social construction as it is an objective or essential
phenomenon in the abstract. Furthermore, italso suggests that as the relation
ship between elites and masses changes, clientelism becomes as much a strug
gle over symbolic resources and political 'credit' as it is over jobs, infrastruc
ture and access to the state.

Concluding

Remarks

Clientelism is one of those social science concepts that has achieved honorary
status over the years. This means thatwhile it features prominently in all but a
few texts on Latin America,
it is rarely the subject of scrutiny. In this paper I
have argued that, with few exceptions, recent scholarship has insisted on a
crude, static and misleading distinction between clientelist and non-clientelist
politics and misrepresented or ignored the ways inwhich contemporary clien
telism functions, itsmeaning as an expression of popular engagement - or
- and its
broader political significance.
disengagement
This is not to say that clientelism is no longer a mechanism of political mobi
lization that serves the interests of conservative or even authoritarian elites.
On the contrary.What itmeans is thatwe must take clientelism more seriously
and be open to the possibility that itplays a role in the democratic process that

transcends notions of conformity and resistance. Indeed, I would argue that
recent research on local politics inBrazil and other countries of Latin America
suggests thatmany of the so-called 'progressive' features of popular political
culture that have been attributed to new social movement activity are, in fact,
elements that are essential, ifnot specific, to clientelism. In other words, while
those who embrace or make use of clientelism have not rewoven or reconfi
gured the fabric of collective action inBrazil, they have, without a doubt, artic
ulated new demands, established alternative discursive arenas, challenged
dominant practices and achieved, at the very least, a measure of symbolic pow
er.

- in itsmore
specifically, itcould be argued that clientelism
contempo
- has
fashioned new constituencies that are confrontational, often
rary guise
times disloyal and committed to the ideal of rights and that, as a consequence,
politicians inBrazil have towork much harder at delivering goods and services
as a means to generate or secure votes.
Finally, it could also be argued that the
constituencies that embrace or make use of clientelism are to be distinguished
from those that endured traditional clientelist tieswith the
populist-corporatist
and authoritarian political establishments of the recent and not so recent past.
The question is,why has clientelism escaped our attention for so
long? Part
More
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of the answer, I would suggest, has to do with a lack of attention tomatters of
definition. In Brazil, clientelism is a term that is often associated with a very
specific image of a rural and distant past. Alternatively, it is used so loosely and
indiscriminately that itcharacterizes every initiative, statement or position that
is introduced, made or defended by the opposition. Either way, little attention
ispaid to the spectrum of clientelist relations inBrazil or theways these various
relations

work.70

Part of the answer also has to do with the way that we chose to examine
clientelism. It is no mystery why those who adopt a state-centered approach
and focus on formal political institutions see clientelism as a powerful and

and control, and why it is pri
extremely resilient mechanism of manipulation
visit
what
Joel
who
Migdal refers to as the 'trenches'
marily anthropologists
and 'dispersed field offices' who insist that the relationship between elites and
masses is contested at each and every turn.71The question isnot somuch who is
right and who is wrong, but rather how can the insights produced by these
admittedly very different research perspectives and strategies be reconciled
and used to inform each other?72
Finally, clientelism has also escaped our attention because we insist on orga
nizing our thoughts about what is a fluid and extremely complex social phe
nomenon in terms of a simplistic and uncompromising dichotomy that, in real
ity,simply does not exist.73As a consequence, clientelism has long been consid
ered a residual, static and uninteresting category that is unworthy of analysis.
Unfortunately, thismeans that theways inwhich the least privileged elements
of Brazilian society participate in the political process have been given short
thrift. It also means that instead of being perceived as agents of social and
political change, the poor are, essentially, blamed
*

*

for everything.

*

Robert Gay isAssociate Professor of Sociology at Connecticut College, New
London, CT, USA. He is the author of Popular Organization and Democracy
in Rio de Janeiro: A Tale of Two Favelas
(Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1994) and various articles on popular politics inBrazil. He is currently
mass
working on a comparative analysis of the relationship between elites and
es in Brazil and theU.S.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

appears inRobert Gay, 'The Broker and the Thief: A Parable
on
in Brazil)',
Politics
forthcoming in Luso Brazilian Review.
Popular
(Refections
Govern
'Traditional Power Structures and Democratic
See, for example, Frances Hagopian,
F. Lowenthal
and Abraham
ance in Latin America',
(eds),
pp. 64-86 in Jorge I. Dominguez
- Themes
in the 1990s
Latin America and theCaribbean
Governance:
Constructing Democratic
'Illusions About
and Issues (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1996). See also Guillermo O'Donnell,
34-51.
Journal of Democracy
Consolidation',
7(2)(1996):

A

version of this introduction

in Brazil', pp. 53-76 in Christopher
'Clientelism and Military Government
Paul Cammack,
For a
Clapham
(ed.), Private Patronage and Public Power (New York: StMartin's Press, 1982).
see also Eli Diniz and
the
authoritarian
era,
discussion of changes in Brazilian
society during
Sociais e
No Brasil: Atores Politicos, Processos
Democratica
'A Consolidacao
Renato Boschi,
de Interesses', pp. 15-75 inEli Diniz, Renato Boschi and Renato Lessa
(eds),
Intermediagao

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

European

Review

of Latin American

and Caribbean

e Consolidaqdo
Democratica
Modernizacao
Janeiro: Vertice & IUPERJ,
1989).
4. Venicio A. De Lima,
'Brazilian Television

No

Studies

Brasil: Dilemas

65, December
da Nova

1998

Republica

|

19

(Rio de

a
in the 1989 Presidential Election:
Constructing
pp. 97-117 inThomas E. Skidmore
(ed.), Television, Politics, and the Transition to
in Latin America
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
Democracy
(Baltimore:
5. For the impact of elections on the transition to democracy and post authoritarian politics, see
on the Abertu
Bolivar Lamounier,
'Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections
President',

Brazil: Prospects of Transition and Con
ra', pp. 43-79 inAlfred Stepan (ed.), Democratizing
solidation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, 'Elec
of Brazil', pp. 273-298 in Paul W. Drake
tions and the Redemocratization
and Eduardo
Silva
in Latin America,
1980-1985 (San Diego: University of
(eds), Elections and Democratization

California,
1986).
6. For an illustration of the associations

that were made between popular organization
and poli
Moreira
'Grassroots Organizations,
Trade Unions
and the
tics, see Maria Helena
Alves,
to Controlled Abertura
Church: A Challenge
in Brazil', Latin American
Perspectives
2(11)

(1984):73-102.
7. For example, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato argue that the impact of new social movements
on democratization
not in terms of the achievement
'should be conceived
of certain sub
stantive goals or the perpetuation of themovement, but rather in terms of the democratization

of values, norms, and institutions that are rooted ultimately in political culture'. Jean Cohen
and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), p. 562.
8. The literature on new social movements
is vast. Among
the more influential pieces are Jean

and Contemporary
Social Move
Cohen,
'Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical
Pardigms
Tilman Evers,
Side of
ments', Social Research
52(4)(1985):663-716;
'Identity: The Hidden
New Social Movements
inLatin America',
Slater (ed.), New Social Move
pp. 43-72 inDavid
ments and the State in Latin America
'Movi
(Amsterdam: CEDLA,
1985); Eunice Durham,
mentos Sociais e a Construcao
da Cidadania',
Novos Estudos
and Pedro Ro
10(1984):24-30;
berto Jacobi, 'Movimentos Sociais
Teoria e Pratica em Questao',
pp. 246-275 in Use Scherer
Warren
and Paulo J.Krischke
No Cotidiano?
Os Novos Movimentos
(eds), Uma Revoluqao
Sociais Na America Do Sul (Sao Paulo: Brasiliense,
1987).

9. See,

for example,
Inaia Maria Noreira
de Carvalho
and Ruthy Nadia Laniado,
'Transicao
Politicas Publicas e Movimentos
Sobreira
Democratica,
Sociais', pp. 108-133 inAlexandrina
de Moura
(ed.), O Estado E As Politicas Publicas Na Transicao Democratica
(Sao Paulo:
Vertice, 1989).
10. For the suggestion that public works no longer translate into votes, see Teresa Pires do Rio
'Electoral Struggles in a Neighborhood
on the Periphery of Sao Paulo', Politics &
Caldeira,

Society15(l)(1986-87):43-66.

11. Sonia E. Alvarez
and Evelina Dagnino,
Movimentos
Sociais, a Nova Cidadania

'Para Alem da 'Democracia
Realmente
Existente':
e a Configuracao
de Espacos
Publicos Alternatives'.
da Associac^o
e Pesquisa
Nacional
de Pos Gradua^ao

Paper presented at the Encontro Anual
em Cienias Sociais
Caxambu, MG,
1995, p. 10.
(ANPOCS),
12. Alvarez
and Dagnino,
'Para Alem da 'Democracia
Realmente
Existente',
p. 20. See also Ana
Maria Doimo, A Vez e a Voz do Popular: Movimentos
Sociais e participacao
politica no Brasil
pds-70 (Rio de Janeiro: ANPOCS,
1995).
13. Linda Lewin suggests that clientelism has been overlooked
'attention has been direc
because
ted... to urbanization,
and nationalism
rather than to those
immigration, industrialization,
that conserved historical patterns of political
aspects of social organization
Politics and Parantela
inParaiba: A Case Study of Family-Based
Oligarchy
ton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 10.

14. Richard

Graham

life'. Linda

Lewin,

inBrazil

(Prince

that in 1881 Brazilian
legislators reduced the size of the electorate
to Graham,
this decision was made at the
1,000,000 to 150,000. According
behest of rural and urban elites who feared that rapid social change and the
impending aboli
tion of slavery would undermine
their ability to control the political participation
of the so
called
and Politics
in Nineteenth Century
'dangerous classes'. Richard Graham,
Patronage
Brazil
'Clien
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 182-206. See also Cammack,
telism and Military Government';
and Scott Mainwaring,
'Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless De
from an estimated

argues

and Timothy R. Scully (eds), Building Democratic
mocracy', p. 355-398 in Scott Mainwaring
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
15. Maria Helena
Guimaraes
Castro and Vilmar E. Faria, 'Polftica Social e Consolidacjio
De

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

20

| RobertGay
No Brasil',

mocratica
cas.

pp. 194-215

in Sobreira

de Moura

(ed.), O Estado

E As Politicas

Publi

constitute between 5% and 10% of the eco
employees
and that 'voters whose likelihood depend on local gov
'The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local
their leaders'. Barry Ames,

16. Barry Ames argues that government
in Brazil
nomically active population

ernment will surely support
in the 1989 Brazilian

Political Science
Presidential
Election', American
Aluisio Alves
in 1985, Minister
of Administration
1994):95-111. Also,
in the federal administration
estimated that 125,000 people had been given positions
through
public service exams, and that 1.7 million had been hired 'according to criteria I don't under
'Brazil: Weak
Parties'.
inMainwaring,
stand, because
they are eminently political'. Quoted

Party Organization
Review 88(l)(March

17. Ames,
'The Reverse Coattails Effect'.
in Brazil
Traditional Politics and Regime Change
18. See, for example, Frances Hagopian,
(New
'Brazil: Weak Parties;' and Guil
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17;Mainwaring,
and Paradoxes',
lermo O'Donnell,
'Transitions, Continuities,
pp. 17-56 in Scott Mainwaring,
Consolidation:
and J. Samuel Valenzuela
O'Donnell
Guillermo
(eds), Issues inDemocratic
The New

South American

Notre Dame

in Comparative

Perspective

(Indiana:

of

University

pp. 241-243.
electoral system, see Alan Angell, Maria D'Alva
Kinzo, and Diego
Ai
in
Roderic
183-205
in
Latin
America',
pp.
Camp
(eds), Democ
Urbaneja,
'Electioneering
racy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles (Wilmington: Jaguar, 1996).

19. Hagopian,
For details

20.

Democracies

Press, 1992).
Traditional Politics,
as to Brazil's

'Brazil: Weak Parties'.
21. Mainwaring,
in Brazil',
and the New Political Order
'Social Movements
22. See, for example, Renato Boschi,
(eds), State &
pp. 179-212 in John D. Wirth, Edson de Oliveira Nunes and TE. Bogenschild
Press, 1987); and Ruth Correa
Continuity and Change
(Boulder: Westview
Society in Brazil
of Democracy',
in the Context of the Consolidation
Leite Cardoso,
'Popular Movements
and Sonia E. Alvarez
291-302 inArturo Escobar
of Social Movements
(eds), The Making

pp.
in

Press, 1992).
(Boulder: Westview
claims that
in general, Joe Foweraker
in Latin America
Speaking of popular sector demands
can easily be absorbed or diverted within
demands
'The majority of "economic
corporate"
are
along clientelist and corporatist lines. Indeed, such systems
political systems organized

Latin America
23.

24.

of demand, and then providing par
especially effective in separating and isolating this order
favours and ac
tial satisfaction, and often ensuring cooptation,
through granting (personal)
(London: Pluto,
cording (restricted) privileges'. Joe Foweraker, Theorizing Social Movements
1995), p. 81.
Re
'On the Brazilian Urban Poor: An Anthropological
See, for example, Roberto DaMatta,

and Social Policy Series Working Paper no.10, Kellogg
Institute, University
and
Pentecostals
Spring 1995; Cecilia Loreto Mariz, Coping With Poverty:
inBrazil (Philadelphia:
Christian Base Communities
Temple University Press, 1994); and Kurt
1974-1986
Transition
in Democratic
Voter: Mass
Politics
The Brazilian
Von Mettenheim,
port', Democracy
of Notre Dame,

11-13.
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), pp.
25. Many social scientists speak of a system of 'social apartheid'. See, for example, Elimar Pinhei
ro Nascimento,
'Exclusao: A Nova Questao
Social', Proposta
(FASE)(61)(1994):40-43.
inBrazil: Problems and
& Scott Mainwaring,
26. See, for example, Frances Hagopian
'Democracy
'Brazilian Party Un
Scott Mainwaring,
Prospects', World Policy Journal 4(3)(1987):487-514;
inComparative
Perspective', Political
derdevelopment
'Dilemas Da Consolidagao
707; and Jose Ialvaro Moises,
and J.A. Guilhon Albuquerque
in Jose Ialvaro Moises

Democracia

Science Quarterly 107(4)(1992-3):677
No Brasil', pp. 119-177
Democratica
Da
Da Consolidagao
Dilemas
(eds),

(Sao Paulo: Paz E Terra, 1989).
those who argue against the compulsory vote do not talk about
of the poor. It is clear from research that examines
participation

its impact on the
who would and
political
would not vote, however, that the poor would be effectively disenfranchised. This is particular
determine how and even if a whole range of basic public
ly true of local level elections which
recent data as to who would and would not vote in
goods and services will be delivered. For
Brazil, see the various articles in the Jornal Do Brasil 10/27/96. For the context of the debate in

27. Of course,

see Timothy Power, 'Why Brazil Slept: The Search for Political Institutions, 1985-1997'.
Studies Association
Mexico,
meetings, Guadalajara,
Paper presented at the Latin American
1997. For a discussion of the compulsory vote in comparative perspective, see Arend Lijphart,

Brazil,

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Revista

28.

Europea

de Estudios

Latinoamericanos

y del Caribe

65, diciembre

de

1998

Unresolved
American Political Science
Dilemma',
'Unequal Participation: Democracy's
view 91(1)(1997),
pp. 1-14.
For the relationship between clientelism and collective action, or inaction, see Hagopian

| 21
Re
and

in Brazil'. For the notion that clientelism involves the extension of
Mainwaring,
'Democracy
and Brazil (New York: Praeg
trust, see Luis Roniger, Hierarchy and Trust inModern Mexico
er, 1990), p. 13.

29. O'Donnell,
and Paradoxes',
'Transitions, Continuities,
p. 44.
e Consolidacao
See, for example, Fabio Wanderley
Reis,
'Partidos, Ideologia
Democratica',
Reis and Guillermo O'Donnell
No Bra
pp. 296-326 inFabio Wanderley
(eds), A Democracia
sil: Dilemas E Perspectivas
Jelin as
(Sao Paulo: Vertice, 1988). See also comments by Elizabeth
to the association between clientelism and what she calls the 'naturalization of domination'.

30.

Elizabeth

and Rights', pp. 101-119 in
Jelin, 'Citizenship Revisited:
Solidarity, Responsibility,
Jelin and Eric Hershberg
Human
(eds), Constructing Democracy:
Rights, Citizen
ship, and Society in Latin America
(Boulder: Westview,
1996).
inLatin America;'
and Andre
See, for example, Angell, Kinzo, and Urbaneja,
'Electioneering
pp. 135-152 inBolivar Lamou
Singer, 'Collor na Periferia: A Volta Por Cima do Populismo?',

Elizabeth
31.

nier (ed.), Geisel A Collor: O Balanco
da Transicao
IDESP,
(Sao Paulo:
1990).
32. Bryan Roberts argues that while there is overwhelming
evidence that the poor inLatin Amer
ica are in no sense 'marginal', their mobilization
has been of a limited nature such that the

33.

34.

'political pessimism of the early analysts of marginality was, in that sense, well founded'. Bryan
'The Social Context of Citizenship
inLatin America',
International Journal of Urban
Roberts,
and Regional Research 20(l)(1996):38-65.
See, for example, Hagopian
Behavior
and Corruption

46(4)(1994):549-62.
Jose Murilo

de Carvalho,

and Mainwaring,
in the Consolidation
'Estudos

de Poder

inBrazil;' and Amanda
Sives, 'Elite
'Democracy
of Democracy
inBrazil', Parliamentary Affairs

Local

no Brasil',

Revista

Brasileira

de Estudos

Politicas

25-26(July-January)(1968-69):231-48.
35. Hagopian,
Traditional Politics, p. 138.
36. Hagopian,
Traditional Politics, p. 152.
37. Hagopian,
Traditional Politics, p. 16.

38. To her credit, Hagopian
does mention the fact that voters can no longer be herded to the polls
and that bosses are now mediators
for categorical as well as individualistic transactions. Hago

pian, Traditional Politics,
39. Eli Diniz, Voto eMdquina

p. 60.
Politica:

e Clientelismo no Rio de Janeiro
Patronagem
(Paz e Terra,
1982).
40. For the relationship between theMDB
and low-income communities
inRio, see Diniz, Voto e
Politica, pp. 139-158.
Mdquina
41. For an incisive critique of Diniz's work, see Alba Zaluar, A Mdquina
e a Revolta: As Orga
e o Significado da Pobreza
nizaqdes Populares
(Sao Paulo: Brasiliense,
1985), pp. 48-49.
42. Susan Stokes, Cultures
in Conflict: Social Movements
and the State in Peru (Berkeley: Uni
versity of California Press, 1995). For similarities between the Peruvian and Brazilian
case, see

Scott Mainwaring
and Timothy Scully, 'Conclusion: Parties and Democracy
inLatin America
Different Pattern, Common
and Timothy R.
pp. 459-474 in Scott Mainwaring
Challenges',
Institutions: Party Systems inLatin America
Scully (eds), Building Democratic
(Stanford: Stan
ford University Press, 1995).
43. Stokes, Cultures in Conflict, p. 116.
44. The idea that clientelism is associated with a distinct and separate culture is a common one and
has been

taken to its logical extreme by Robert Putnam
in his work on Italy. Putnam
talks
two Italies: one characterized by mutual trust,
honesty, civic engagement and horizontal
forms of association,
the other by mistrust, lawlessness, civic apathy,
corruption, personal
and hierarchy. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy
Work: Civic Traditions
in
dependency
about

Modern

Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.
Class Conflict
French, The Brazilian Workers' ABC:
Paulo
Press, 1992),
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
46. This term is very often used to describe patron-client groups
45.

John D.

more

'natural' categorical associations.
and Political Change
in Southeast Asia',

115.
and Alliances

inModern

Sao

pp. 1-16.
and to distinguish them from
See, for example, James Scott, 'Patron-Client Politics
pp. 123-146 in Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

22

| RobertGay
(eds), Friends, Followers, and Factions
(Berkeley: University of
Press, 1977).
the observation
that clientelism does not impede the formation of horizontal
ties among

H. Lande

and James C. Scott

California
47. For

e a Revolta, p. 232. For a well developed
analysis of the
see Gerrit Burgwal, Struggle of the Poor: Neighborhood
in a Quito Squatter Settlement (Amsterdam:
and Clientelist Practice
CEDLA,
Organization
1995). The collective, or corporate, nature of contemporary clientelism has also been noted by
in his recent work on Colombia.
said this, however, Martz remains faithful
JohnMartz
Having
the poor,

concept

see Zaluar, A Maquina
of 'collective clientelism'

to a very traditional conception of the form,meaning and significance of clientelism. See, John
and the State in Colombia
D. Martz, The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy
(London: Trans
action, 1997).
48. Bryan Roberts argues that '[p]atronage, the old stand-by of Latin American
governments
[is]
not enough to buy off opposition
since it [is] no longer the case of buying off particularly
'The
groups, but of satisfying a general urban need'. Roberts,
well-organized
neighborhood
fails to appreciate, however, that clientelism can
Social Context of Citizenship',
p. 55. Roberts

not only the explicit exchange of votes for goods and services between political actors
and specific individuals or well organized
and defined groups, but also a more
implicit but
and whole
firm understanding
between public administrations
nonetheless
regions that it
takes a cerain amount of government activity to produce votes.
A Divida Divina:
Troca e Patron
P.D.Lanna
For this observation vis-a-vis Brazil, see Marcos
describe

49.

agem no Nordeste Brasileiro
1995), p. 33; Jose de Souza Martins, O
(Campinas: Unicamp,
da Historia Lenta (Sao Paulo: Editora Hucitec,
Poder Do Atraso: Ensaios de Sociologia
1994),
inBrazil
Power and Ideology
p. 29; and Peter McDonough,
(Princeton: Princeton University
from other contexts, see Judith Chubb, Patronage,
Press, 1981), p. 96. For similar observations
Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities (Cambridge University Press, 1982),
inFormal Systems: A Theo
'Informal Exchange Networks
p. 167; and Larissa Adler Lomnitz,

retical Model', American Anthropologist
90(1988):42-55.
50. For party volatility, see Scott Mainwaring,
'Parties, Electoral Volatility, and Democratization:
at the Latin American
Studies Association
since 1982', Paper Presented
Brazil
Meetings,
1995.
D.C,
Washington,
51. Victor Nunes Leal observes that there were reports of employees betraying their landlords in
e
as far back as the elections in 1945 and 1947. Victor Nunes Leal, Coronelismo,
Enxada
no Brasil (Sao Paulo: Alfa-tmega,
e o Regime Representativo
Voto: O Municipio
1975), p. 12.
For an account of theway this game is played in contemporary Brazil, see Robert Gay, Popular
A Tale of Two Favelas
and Democracy:
Temple University Press,
(Philadelphia:
Organization
1994), pp. 101-112.
52. Populism, corporatism and clientelism are terms that are used interchangeably and somewhat
In general, however, corporatism refers
indiscriminately in the literature on Latin American.
Brazil

such as labor
to attempts by the state to interfere with and control popular organizations
a
associations.
unions and neighborhood
Populism, on the other hand, is concept that is used
and pre-political electorate
to describe the relationship between a largely urban, unorganized
and oftentimes charismatic elites. And, finally, clien
and anti-establishment,
manipulative

of dependency, unequal
exchange and subordination
to both corporatism and populism. For an illustration of the
of Consent:
way corporatism has been applied to Brazil, see Youssef Cohen, The Manipulation
inBrazil (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press,
Consciousness
The State and Working-Class
na Politica Brasileira
in Brazil, see Francisco Weffort, O Populismo
(Rio
1989). For populism
telism is used

to describe

that are assumed

the relations

to be essential

de Janeiro: Paz E Terra, 1980). For an insightful essay on the way that populism has been
villified by social scientists, the political Right and, in particular, the Left, see Paul Drake,
L. Conniff (ed.), Latin American
for Populism?',
'Conclusion: Requiem
pp. 217-246 inMichael
of New Mexico
in
Press, 1982).
Perspective
University
Comparative
(Albuquerque:
Populism
and pluralism. Author
53. Fox distinguishes between authoritarian
clientelism, semiclientelism
is se
of the masses
itarian clientelism refers to situations where the political subordination
cured by means of the selective distribution of patronage and the use or threat of force. Semi
of the masses
is solicited by
clientelism refers to situations where the political subordination
in the form of nonenforceable
but explicit
of the selective distribution of patronage
'deals'. Pluralism refers to situations where access to state resources no longer depends on an
Jonathan Fox, 'The Difficult Transition
individual or group's status or political persuasion.

means

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

European

Review

from Clientelism

of Latin American

to Citizenship:

Lessons

and Caribbean
fromMexico',

Studies

65, December

World Politics

1998

| 23

46 (January 1994):151

184.
54. Fox, 'The Difficult Transition', p. 180.
ismade by Zaluar, A Mdquina
55. This observation
'Houses Divided:
Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius,
249 inMainwaring
56. For a brilliant and

e a Revolta, pp. 237-238. See also, Ann L.
inMexico',
Parties and Political Reform
pp.
Institutions.
and Scully (eds), Building Democratic
insightful analysis of this situation in the context of the U.S., see Thomas
in Chicago
Politics in Transition: Party and Community
(Chicago: Uni

Guterbok, Machine
versit of Chicago Press,

57. The words
research

58.

of Jose Murilo

on clientelism

1980), p. 75.
de Carvalho

proved, once again, prophetic when he remarked of
is almost always present, implicitly or
that: 'an evaluative position
it is incompat
.is considered something that must disappear because

explicitly. Coronelismo..
ible with a truly democratic
See, for example, Hagopian's
tics, p. 165.

'Estudos de Poder Local', p. 240.
regime'. Carvalho,
comments vis-a-vis PRODECOM.
Traditional
Hagopian,

Poli

recent trou
Trabalhista's
59. For example, there is evidence that the Partido Democratico
(PDT)
bles inRio de Janeiro have to do with the party's inability or unwillingness, whilst in power, to
deal with the increase in drug-related violence. See, Gay, 'The Broker and the Thief.

60. Many scholars insist on what, I would argue, is a false distinction between the clientelist vote
'Clientelist Control and Authoritarian
Con
and the 'free' vote. See, for example, Ian Rouqui,
and Slain Rouqui
texts', pp. 19-3, in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose
(eds), Elections without
.
Choice
(New York: John Wiley, 1978
61. Teresa Caldeira
argues that 'the distinction we make between the 'ideological vote' and the
'clientelist vote' is a false one: they are but two aspects of the same practice, two sides of the
same coin'. Teresa Pires do Rio Caldeira, A Politica Dos Outros: O Cotidiano
dos Moradores
da Periferia e o que Pensam do Poder e dos Poderosos
(Sao Paulo: Brasiliense,
1984), p. 239.
See also, Geert A. Banck,
'Poverty, Politics and the Shaping of Urban
Space: A Brazilian
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
10(4)(1986):522-540;
Gay,
Example',
e a Revolta, p. 225.
and Democracy,
pp. 125-126; and Zaluar, A Mdquina
Popular Organization

and Laniado
benefits, the institutional
argue that, in the case of unemployment
ization of specific, universalistic criteria has excluded
larger and larger numbers of workers in
the assump
Brazil. Carvalho
and Laniado, Transic,ao Democratica'.
Others have questioned
tion that universalism
is necessarily embraced by the least privileged elements of society. See,

62. Carvalho

in a Relational
for example, Roberto DaMatta,
'The Quest
for Citizenship
Universe',
pp.
307-335 inWirth, Nunes and Bogenschild
(eds), State & Society in Brazil; and Ayse Giines
'Clientelism: Premodern, Modern,
Postmodern',
pp. 19-28 in Luis Roniger and Ayse
Ayata,

and Civil Society (Boulder:
Clientelism,
(eds), Democracy,
Lynne Reinner,
1994).
63. Banck,
'Poverty, Politics and the Shaping of Urban Space'.
64. Geert A. Banck,
'Democratic Transparancy
and the Train of Joy and Happiness:
Local Politic
ians and the Dilemmas
of Political Change
in Brazil', pp. 135-156 in Jojada Verrips
(ed.),
Gunes-Ayata

inHonor
Transactions. Essays
of Jeremy Boissevain
(Amsterdam:
Spinhuis, 1994).
65. Burgwal, Struggle of the Poor.
66. See also, Beth Cohen,
and the Local State: The
'Squatter Settlements, Community Leaders,
Role of Participatory Policy inBrazil's Transition toDemocracy',
Master of Public Affairs and
Arts Dissertation,
'Quando os Movi
University of Texas at Austin, 1995; Linda M. Gondim,
versus Democracia
mentos se Organizam:
Burocracia
Direta nas Associates
de Moradores',
and Irlys Alencar
F. Barreira
pp. 67-91 in Elimar Pinheiro do Nascimento
(eds), Brasil Ur
bano: Cendrios da Ordem e da Desordem
(Rio de Janeiro: Notrya, 1993); and Nico Vink, 'Does
Popular Culture Exist inBrazil?' pp. 151-162 inGeert Banck and Kees Koonings
(eds), Social
in Contemporary
Brazil: Politics, Class and Culture in a Decade
Change
of Transition (Am

sterdam: CEDLA,
67. Cristina Escobar,
65-85 inRoniger

1988).
'Clientelism

and Social Protest: Peasant Politics inNorthern Colombia',
pp.
and Gunes-Ayata
Clientelism, and Civil Society.
(eds), Democracy,
68. This apparent contradiction was also observed by Carl Lande who remarked that 'extreme
in wealth and power between members
differences
of different social strata, facilitate the
harsh exploitation
of those who are not given special protection of some patron. This may
explain why clientelism may flourish, or be idealized, in societies which in other respects are
harshly exploitative and where there prevails a general cynicism as to the possibility of genu

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

| RobertGay

24

in the relations between different social classes. As a result a man
inely selfless benevolence
who has been favored above his fellows...may
still be impelled to revolt against a system
...which he finds to be inequitable'.
Carl Lande,
'Introduction: The Dyadic Basis of Clien
telism', pp. xiii-xxxvii

69.
70.

71.

in Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Lande and James C. Scott
(eds), Friends, Followers, and Factions
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
Javier Auyero,
in the Jour
'Performing Evita. A Tale of Two Peronist Women'.
Forthcoming
nal of Contemporary
Ethnography.

In this sense, there is a need for research that documents and examines the different varieties
of clientelism that exist inBrazil, along the lines of Roniger's more comparative and historical
and Trust.
ly-grounded work. See, Roniger, Hierarchy
to Struggles forDomination',
Joel S. Migdal,
'The State in Society: An Approach
pp. 7-34 in
Joel S. Migdal,

Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue, (eds), State power and social forces: Domination
in the Third World (London: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See also
and Transformation
'The Legacy of Authoritarianism
inDemocratic
Brazil', pp. 237-253 in
Sergio Paulo Pinheiro,
Stuart S. Nagel
and Public Policy
Press,
(ed.), Latin American Development
(St. Martin's

1994).

72. For a recent attempt to provide a 'decentered'
W. Rubin,
the Regime: Culture
'Decentering
ican Research Review 31(3)(1996):85-126.

see Jeffrey
to state power inMexico,
approach
and Regional
Politics inMexico',
Latin Amer

sure to qualify their positions by
course, scholars who employ such dichotomies make
recognizing that there is a certain amount of slippage between the two extremes. The effect,
is to direct our attention towhat are usually clear cut and idealized extremes and
nonetheless,
away from what is,more often than not, the more interesting and analytically troubling mate

73. Of

rial in the middle.

This content downloaded on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

